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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to find out the trigger of 
fraud in the management of grant funds. This study uses 
qualitative method with configurative-ideographic case 
study approach aimed at analyzing the trigger of fraud 
in the management of community group grant funds 
more deeply. Data were obtained through interviews with 
informants consisting of Manut agency, as the manager of 
society group grant funds, and some grant recipients as 
well as other parties involved in the management of the 
grant funds. The result of this study indicates that the 
trigger of fraud in the management of grant funds is the 
dominance of access to grant funds by certain parties and 
the implementation of grant fund management which is not 
in accordance with the rules that have been set.
Introduction
The 1999 reform movement was the beginning of 
community involvement in development which was marked 
by the birth of civil society. Community involvement has 
come true. The community power can be made as a check 
and balance by the government, as an “authority”, in making 
policies and determining the direction of development. In 
addition, it can create a strong relationship between the 
government and the people. In its process, this change 
of power pattern also shifts the pendulum of corruption. 
The community, unfortunately, has also contributed to 
smooth the practice of corruption. Reflecting on the 
case of Community Social and Economic Management 
Program (P2SEM) grant funds occurred in Hilir Province, 
many stakeholders from educational institutions, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), Islamic Boarding 
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Schools, and community groups as the grand 
recipients have been involved in the cases of 
corruption.
For almost ten years, the cases of grant 
funds involving multiple elements have been 
occurring, but the disclosure of the cases is 
still selective. The existence of grant funds 
always adorns the Regional Budget documents 
every year, and even the budget allocation is 
increasing from year to year. Referring to the 
Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs 
(Permendagri) No 14 of 2016 on grant funds 
distribution, the post of grant expenditure is 
one of the most interesting expenditure posts 
in the Regional Budget which even become the 
“scramble” of society. This is because this type 
of expenditure is a non-repayable expenditure. 
However, in its development, the grant aid 
often takes victims, both the state and the 
community, as a result of misuse of grant funds. 
This can happen at least due to two factors: 
firstly, the systems and mechanisms made by 
the local government cannot be implemented 
properly; secondly, the occurrence of moral 
hazard among unscrupulous state organizers 
and unscrupulous community.
The distribution of grant aid by local 
government is prone to abuse, especially 
in the run-up to the election of the regional 
head. There is a tendency that the grant aid 
is used as a political imaging tool by the 
Regional Head / Deputy Head, especially the 
incumbent. The studies conducted by Ritongga 
et al. (2010); Amalia et al. (2013); Winoto 
et al. (2015) find that grant funds are used 
by policy makers for personal and political 
gain. The studies also find the fact that grant 
funds are utilized by incumbents for the 
interest in nominating regional heads. This is 
evidenced by inappropriate grant recipients and 
disbursement processes that are inconsistent 
with the procedures and designations. Various 
modes of practice are used through budgeting 
in Regional Budget so that the allocation is 
less appropriate on the target, although actually 
there are many other people who really need 
the grand.
For the Hilir provincial government, 
the grant fund program is an integral part of 
Regional Budget management. The allocation 
of grant fund to the Hilir provincial government 
has increased every year. Hilir provincial 
government has an obligation to improve the 
welfare of the community but unfortunately it 
has the limitation to apply the program directly 
so that the grant funds mechanism is considered 
the right solution. Here is a description of 
the allocation of grant expenditure in Hilir 
Province:
Table 1
List of the Amount of Grant Funds
No Year Allocation
1 2012 3,86,450,909,000
2 2013 4,193,687,850,000
3 2014 4,536,420,310,000
4 2015 5,270,776,500,000
5 2016 7,366,046.600.000
Source; Regional Regulation of Regional 
Budget, BPKAD of Hilir Province, processed
The increase in grant allocation in the 
Regional Budget of Hilir provincial government 
is reasonable. The increase is caused by several 
factors, such as the increase in income, size of 
region, target program, etc. This is based on an 
interview with Mr. Mario, who says:
“As explained earlier, the 
increase in grant allocation is 
a natural thing. This increase 
is due to the increase in the 
provincial budget. Besides, it 
is also caused by an increasing 
need. An increase in grant means 
an increase in the proposed 
development fund or grant fund 
by the community.”
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Based on the interview, it can be 
explained that the increase in the allocation 
of grants for Hilir province is a reasonable, 
especially when measured by the size of the 
region and the amount of Regional Budget. 
In addition, the increase in the grand funds is 
also caused by the amount of grant proposed 
by the community and the policy taken by 
the the local government. Based on the above 
background, the problems that will be revealed 
in this research is: What are the triggers of 
fraud in the management of grants funds given 
to the community groups in Hilir provincial 
government. 
Method 
This research was conducted to reveal 
the social reality without reducing the substance 
and purpose of the study (Kamayanti, 2016). 
The research objects were Manut Agency of 
Hilir provincial government and the community 
group as the grant recipient. This research 
was conducted using qualitative method, with 
a case study approach. It was chosen for a 
specification on an occasion (Creswell, 2014). 
Data were obtained through interviews and 
from other supporting documents to identify 
and analyze the trigger of fraud in the grant 
management process.
The Description of Grant Funds 
Management
The management of grant funds in 
Manut Agency refers to Governor Regulation 
Number 40 of 2016 on the procedure of planning, 
budgeting, implementation and administration, 
reporting and accountability, and monitoring 
and evaluation of the grant aids. Based on this 
Governor Regulation, grant funds management 
is divided into three main phases: planning and 
budgeting, implementation, and accountability. 
Planning and implementation mechanisms by 
Regional Work Unit are formally arranged as 
follows:
Figure 1
Planning and Implementation Mechanisms
Planning Implementation 
  
 
Proposal
Verification of 
grand proposal
Delivering the 
results--> 
Governur --
>TAPD
Preparation, 
Inclusion of KUA 
and PPAS
Discussion with 
Regional 
Parliament
DPA Governor's Decree 
on 
grand recipient
Signing of 
NPHD and 
Integrity pact
Preparation and 
approval of SPP 
Documents
BPKAD --> 
SP2D
Bank validation 
of SP2D
Election of Chairman 
and Teasurer  
Implementation of grant funds is 
an implementation of decisions aimed at 
achieving the objectives that have been decided 
in the policy (Vries, 2013). But in practice, the 
mechanism is not running properly. Based on 
information from Mr. Abel, the representative 
of Manut Agency, his agency was not involved 
in the process of planning and management of 
grants. His agency was only designated based 
on the Budget Execution Document (DPA) 
given by the Local Government Budget Team 
(TAPD).
Budget Execution Document (DPA) is 
the basis for the management of grant funds 
in this Regional Work Unit (SKPD). The 
involvement of Manut Agency in the planning 
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process leads to the omission of administrative 
selection and verification of proposals and 
recipient candidates. Administrative selection 
and verification of this proposal are important 
as governor’s guidance in determining 
the allocation of grant funds and potential 
recipients. The same thing was conveyed by 
one of the grant recipients who said that he had 
applied for grant funds through his right-hand 
friend, a member of Regional Parliament of 
East Java Province.
Pattern of Fraud in the Management of 
Grant Funds
The definition of fraud in the 
management of grant funds covers not only 
the incompatibility between the guidelines and 
the implementation, but also various forms of 
fraud and activities that could harm the State’s 
finances. Discussion of fraud patterns includes 
fraud at the planning, implementation, and 
accountability phases. At the planning phase, 
the submission of the community group grant 
funds is not accompanied by a proposal and 
the submission is done through informal talks. 
The implementation phase includes fictitious 
activities and the work done by third party. 
The accountability phase includes fictitious 
accountability report. The pattern of fraud in 
grant funds can be seen in Table 2, as follows:
Table 2
Pattern and Modus of Fraud in Grand Funds Management 
Pattern of Fraud Modus
Agency is not involved in the planning Manipulation of budget
Submission without a proposal Manipulation of Community Group
Survey not done Manipulation of activities
Buying and selling program Fictitious activities
Establishing  community group as formality only Marking up
Broker of grant funds Manipulation of Accountability Report
Bribery Recommendation
Disbursement done by broker
Fictitious activities
Activities done by third party
Fictitious Accountability Report
Delayed Accountability Report
Unusual behavior and dishonesty 
with the intention of deceiving other people 
are parts of fraud (Sudarmo et al., 2008). So, 
fraud perpetrators can be categorized as the 
perpetrators of corruption.
The Trigger of Grant Fund Corruption 
Grant Funds are Full of Interests
Grant expenditure is one of the 
expenditure accounts in the Regional Budget 
(APBD) which often attracts public attention. 
This is because there are many parties who 
are concerned with the grant aid. The parties 
can be from executive and legislative. For 
the executive, grant funds are widely used 
to accommodate various interests, both for 
the benefit of the welfare of society and for 
political interests. For the legislative, the 
development budgets are widely utilized by 
the community in his electoral region as a 
form of the fulfillment of his promise during 
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the campaign, in addition to following up 
the community’s proposal. MD3 Law states 
that Regional Parliament has the function of 
legislation and budgetary supervisory. This 
means that the MD3 Law provides an obligation 
to the members of Regional Parliament to 
absorb, collect, accommodate and follow up on 
community aspirations. The obligation is then 
used for a rationalization through the proposed 
program of activities. This was proven in an 
interview conducted to Joni (pseudonym), one 
of the members of the Provincial Parliament of 
Hilir Province:
“The members of Parliament 
have several obligations: 
1) collecting the community 
aspirations. It is done 
periodically with the aim of 
meeting constituents in the 
respective electoral region 
which is then called a recess. 
The recess becomes a means of 
absorbing aspirations directly 
to the community to know the 
management of Regional Budget 
and other local government 
policies, either the benefit or the 
impact. From this recess, there 
will be recommendations and 
suggestions; 2) following up the 
aspirations of the community. 
The results of the aspirations 
collection are then followed up 
institutionally to the relevant 
Regional Work Unit to be 
accommodated in the Regional 
Budget program of the following 
year. The form and mechanism of 
the program are then submitted 
to the executive.”
From the above interviews, it is clear 
that the members of the Regional Parliament 
have an interest in the development program 
especially regarding the proposals that have 
been submitted and obtained through the recess 
forum. The impact of its management cannot 
be separated from the conflict of interest. This 
is in accordance with the research conducted 
by Sjahrir, et al., 2013, that the approval of the 
Regional Budget raises the conflict of interest. 
This occurs due to the authority possessed 
by members of Regional Parliament. This 
authority is used to “pay” their promises during 
their past campaigns.
Structured and Massive Brokers
The existence of a grant fund broker is 
very easy to detect. First, during the preparation 
of Regional Grant Agreement Text (NPHD), 
he is the busiest person in conditioning his 
community group. The tools he carries are 
quite complete, starting from the laptop, 
printer and operator. These tools are brought to 
anticipate any proposal improvement. Second, 
through tracking. This step is a bit difficult 
because if we do not have access, we will not 
be allowed to enter this area. This area is said 
a “secret” area. The researchers tried to search 
by going to the “headquarters” which served as 
the coordination center. The house inside this 
residential area was a new house belonging to 
an official. The position held was an important 
position and closely related to political parties 
and elections. When the researchers arrived, 
the researchers were greeted with a smile and 
said “sorry a bit messy, friend”. Others said 
“pursued by the target”. Seeing some people 
who were busy with laptops and printing, 
others were busy stamping and recording juslt 
like the administrative affairs in the office. The 
researchers found that what they were doing 
some unfinished Accountability Report of the 
community group as the grant recipient fiscal 
year 2016 and unfinished proposals for fiscal 
year 2017.
For more details, the researchers looked 
at some of the ceramic piles that were later 
believed to be an “inscription”. Inscription 
serves as a marker and information that the 
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development carried out was sourced from 
the Regional budget of Hilir Province and 
listed the name of the community group as the 
recipient. Further investigation indicates that 
the ceramic pile was an inscription that had not 
been distributed to the grant recipient of the 
fiscal year 2016 to be put at the location where 
the activities were carried out.
Continuing on the next few days, when 
the researchers came to the same house, the 
researchers found many parked vehicles on 
the street in front of the house and found many 
people pacing back and forth in and out of the 
house. From interviews with several people, 
it was found that that they wanted to submit 
copy of ID card and account in the name of 
the community group. Some of them were the 
people who were responsible for the community 
groups as the recipient. The researchers 
could not find the leader of the community 
group, but the one who was responsible for 
the management of the community group 
grant funds. The copies of identity cards 
and community group account served as an 
enclosure in the submission of a grant funds 
proposal. In carrying out the action, this team 
worked from preparing proposals to making 
accountability reports. The team was working 
in accordance with their respective areas. 
Each one was responsible for the community 
group he supported. The community group he 
supported could be more than one community 
group in accordance with the ability to recruit 
and account for the agreement or to care for 
the commitments made. From the description 
above, it can be illustrated that the grant funds of 
Hilir Province are controlled by certain group. 
This group is commanded by people who have 
a downward and deep-rooted network. This 
“commander” is a person trusted by the people 
involved in managing the Regional Budget. 
The existence of this community group is due 
to a relationship of interest established on the 
basis of mutual benefit in material matter and 
other interests.
Unclear Monitoring
In accordance with the Governor 
Regulation Number 40 of 2016 on Procedures 
for Budgeting, Implementation and 
Administration, Reporting and Accountability, 
and Monitoring and Evaluation of Grants And 
Social Aids, Article 50 related to monitoring 
and evaluation explains that related agencies 
(Regional Work Unit / Bureau) are obliged to 
perform monitoring and evaluation of grants 
and social aids. In reality, Manut Agency is not 
equipped with sufficient financial to perform 
monitoring. Reality in the field indicates 
that the monitoring on the implementation 
of Community Group cannot be done 
thoroughly. This was conveyed by Mr. Abel, 
the representative of Manut Agency, “The 
implementation of monitoring is not done in a 
comprehensive manner, because the Regional 
Work unit considers the monitoring activities 
are not the duty of the Regional Work Unit.” 
Furthermore, Mr. Abel explained,” In accordance 
with the Regulation of Miniter of Home Affairs 
and Governor Regulation, the management of 
grant funds at Manut Agency is until the stage 
of Regional Grant Agreement Text (NPHD) 
and Disbursement. The monitoring is ideally 
implemented by ispectorate because the budget 
is attached there. The lack of synchronization in 
the management of monitoring or supervision 
indicates the absence of provision that regulates 
the responsibility in the implementation of 
monitoring for the agency appointed by the 
governor.”
Regional Parliament is given Space to apply 
for the program 
One of the contents of the attachment 
in the Governor Regulation No. 40 of 2016 on 
Procedures for Budgeting, Implementation and 
Administration, Reporting and Accountability, 
and Monitoring and Evaluation of Grants and 
Social Aids is that the grant proposal can be 
made through legislative members. Based 
on a closed interview with some members 
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of Regional Parliament, it is found that the 
members of the Regional Parliament can give 
recommendations on the proposal of community 
groups to get grant aid to the executive. 
Besides, the “recommendation” is a form of 
the follow-up of the proposals / aspirations 
presented by the community during the recess 
of the members of the Rgional Parliament. 
But in practice, the members of the Regional 
Parliament can recommend programs outside 
their electoral region. As stated by Abdul, the 
grant recipient of the fiscal year 2015;
“I applied for grants to the 
provincial government through 
a friend who happened to be 
a “staff” of the member of the 
Regional Parliament. I proposed 
two activities, and both were fit 
the order.”
The above interview explicitly states 
that the submission of grant funds through the 
legislative members of Hilir Province is very 
effective. And even the amount of allocated 
funds is approved in accordance with the request 
of the “client”. The growing information which 
says that a member of legislative has a “quota” 
of budgets in the Regional Budget to be 
allocated to the Community Group can be true. 
The large authority owned by the members of 
legislative is then utilized by their supporters 
to access the Regional Budget program. This 
opportunity is also used by the members of the 
legislative to get closer to their constituents 
by making recommendations on their needs 
through Regional Budgets.
Conclusion 
Fraud in the management of 
community group grant funds in Hilir 
Provincial Government is done in marathon 
by the executive, legislative and community. 
Fraud in the management of community group 
grant funds is indicated to have been done in 
a massive, structured and even organized way. 
This certainly has an impact on the results and 
objectives to be achieved. The trigger of this 
fraud is the pressures and needs of each actor 
which then develop into a rationalization in 
order to meet the personal and group interests.
Limitation
This research cannot be separated from 
some limitations. The limited understanding of 
grant-related regulation and the lack of detailed 
supporting data have made the researchers 
difficult to conduct the analysis. Research on 
fraud in grant funds management is a unique 
issue because both the recipients and the 
givers are seen to be equally beneficial. The 
confidentiality contained in the issue has made 
it difficult to find the parties who are willing 
to be informants. Therefore, there is possibility 
that the informants do not provide the data 
honestly.
This study focuses on grant funds given 
to community group. And of course, this study 
provides different results from those that use 
different research objects and models, such 
as grants products or grants to institutions or 
Regional-Owned Enterprises (ROEs).
Suggestion
Suggestion for the Government
Based on the findings of this research, it 
is suggested that both the provincial government 
agency and grant fund management agency 
implement grant funds management procedures 
in a disciplined, transparent, integrated manner. 
Therefore, the results of the implementation 
of the grand funds should be monitored and 
audited regularly. The findings of this research 
are expected to be used as consideration and 
development in policy making to anticipate the 
more severe impact. The finding of fraud in the 
implementation of grant funds management 
should be immediately acted upon otherwise it 
can cause acute moral degradation.
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Suggestion for Further Research
This research focuses on the trigger 
of fraud in grant funds management only. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the next research 
investigate the trigger and pattern of fraud in the 
implementation of grant products management.
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